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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Chad Lee Williams entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled 
substance and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing, reserving his right to challenge the district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress. Because the State failed to meet its burden of shmving 
that the length of Mr. Williams' detention \Vas reasonable and that probable cause supported his 
arrest the district court erred in denying his motion. This Court should vacate Mr. Williams' 
conviction and suppress the evidence seized as a result of his unlawful detention and arrest. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 3, 2014, at around 10:00 pm, the Boise City Police went to an apartment in Boise 
where they believed Cody Bel!enbrock was staying. (Tr., p.8. Ls.6-24, p.9. L.22 p.10, L.3.) 
Mr. Bellenbrock had an outstanding arrest warrant for contempt because he failed to appear for 
drug testing as part of drug court. (State's Ex. I to Suppression Hearing, p.2.) 
Officer Thueson got to the apartment first stood fifty yards in front of the apartment 
behind a dumpster, and ·watched the front of the apartment unit (Tr., p.9, Ls.8-21, p.11, Ls.19-
2 L p.24, Ls.2-6.) Meanwhile, other officers surrounded the building. ([r., p.9, Ls.8-21.) 
About a half-hour later, Officer Thueson sa,\· four people--Mr. Bellenbrock, Mr. Williams, 
Roger Jones, and Alyssa Gill-walk outside to smoke a cigarette. (Tr., p.11, L.3 - p.12, L.12, 
p.15, Ls.1-4, p.31, L.17 p.33, L. 1.) Officer Thueson recognized Mr. Bellenbrock, and 
approached the group to execute the arrest warrant a couple of minutes later. (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-
18.) As soon as Mr. Bellenbrock saw Officer Thueson walking towards them with a flashlight in 
his hand, Mr. Bellenbrock took off running into the apartment and out the back door. (Tr., p.12, 
Ls.13-18.) Officer Thueson could hear a scuffle in the back yard, and ran around to the back of 
p.12, Ls.20--24.) Officer Thueson and an officer that had been in back of 
arrested Mr. Bellenbrock within a minutes. p. 13, 
p.1 
Meanwhile, two other officers detained Mr. Williams, Mr. Jones, and Ms. Gill in front of 
the apartment. Officer Thueson explained: 
[W]e ha[d] a known, wanted felon who just entered a residence and left 
the residence. We had yet to apprehend him. It was unknown if he would reenter 
the residence, access weapons. These three people that were with them, we didn't 
know who they were: if we left them, i r they vvould hm e assisted him in trying to 
avoid being captured, if they were armed. So there was a great deal of officer 
safety elements. 
There was also the crime of harboring a fugitive which needed to be 
investigated as we knew that they had been in the residence with Mr. Bellenbrock. 
I did not know exactly who all was living there aside from Melissa Gill who knew 
about the warrant. .. 
(Tr., p.20, L.23 -p.21, L.13; see also Tr.. p.1 Ls.3-10.) When Officer Thueson \valked back 
around to the front of the apartment about three to four minutes after he first contacted the group, 
he allegedly smelled "the strong odor of marijuana." (Tr., p.12, Ls.12 - p.17, L. 9, p.16, Ls.15-
16.) Officer Thueson said he could not smell any burnt marijuana, just fresh manJuana. 
(Tr., p.28, Ls.5-7.) He asked Ms. Gill, who lived in the apartment, about the smell. (Tr., p.17, 
Ls.l 0-20.) She admitted there was marijuana in the house. (Id) 
The officers then arrested Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones for frequenting. (Tr., p.17, L.21 -
p.18, L.11.) After another officer cuffed Mr. Williams, Mr. Williams ran off dovvn the street. 
(Tr., p.18, L.12- p.19, L.14.) Officer Thueson tackled him not far away. (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-24.) 
During a search incident to arrest, Officer Thueson found methamphetamine, two grams of 
marijuana, and drug paraphernalia on Mr. Williams. (Tr., p.19. L.25 - p.20. L.15.) That search 
happened about fifteen to eighteen minutes after the officers first approached the group. 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.14-22.) The officers also found four grams of marijuana on Mr. Jones and four 
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grams on Mr. Bellenbrock. (Tr., p.34, Ls.8--25.) When the officers later searched the apartment, 
a small amount of one gram total package weight-sealed a 
bag, in plain view on the kitchen table. (Tr., p.26, L.17 - p.27, L.24.) Despite the 
alleged "strong odor of marijuana" (Tr., p.16, Ls.15-16), the officers did not use the two drug 
dogs they had on scene (Tr., p.26, Ls.12--16. p.28, Ls.17-19), did not get a search warrant 
(Tr., p.28, Ls.13-16), and did not search the apartment pursuant to the \vaiver provision in 
Mr. Bellenbrock's probation agreement (see Tr., p.40, Ls.13~18; State's Ex. 1 to Suppression 
Hearing). 
The State later charged Mr. Williams vvith felony possession of a controlled substance 
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, frequenting 
a place where controlled substances are known to be located, and resisting and obstructing 
officers. (R., pp.9-11.) 
Mr. Williams filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his illegal 
detention and arrest. (R., pp. 73-85.) During the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued 
that the officers could not detain Mr. Williams simply because he was in the vicinity when the 
officers arrested Mr. Bellenbrock (R., pp.80-82), but appears to have conceded that the officers 
could stop Mr. Williams to figure out who he was and to imcstigate the crime of harboring a 
fugitive (Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21). Defense counsel also argued that the officers detained 
Mr. Williams for longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop (R., pp.81-83), and 
that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Williams for frequenting because there 
was no reason to believe he knew there was marijuana in the apartment (R., pp.83-85; Tr., p.36, 
L.12 - p.38, L.3 ). The State countered that the officers could lawfully freeze the scene when 
arresting Mr. Bellenbrock, and that the smell of marijuana coming from the apartment and the 
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fact that Mr. Williams had been inside amounted to probable cause supporting his arrest for 
1 (R., pp.93-97; Tr., p.38, L.6 - 19.) 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress. the court made the following findings: 
First, I do find that the officer's testimony is credible .... I do find that, 
in fact, the officer and I guess other officers had been observing this residence for 
some period of time prior to seeing the defendant as well as a few others exiting 
the building. So they knew that Mr. Williams had been inside this 
apartment/townhouse, whatever it is. 
[Y]ou start off first ,Yith whether there was a seizure. Now, Mr. Williams wants 
to argue that there was from the outset an arrest. That's not true. There was a 
seizure and the seizure has to be reasonable because if it's not, then anything that 
flows from that seizure would be suppressible. In this case I want to make it clear 
that individuals who are found on the premises at the inception of a search and 
whose identity and connection to th1.: premises are unknown may be detained for 
the time necessary to determine those facts and to protect the safety of those 
present during the detention. That's State versus Reynolds at 142 Idaho 911. It's 
a Court of Appeals 2007 case. 
And so individuals found at the scene where there is a legitimate-for 
example, the execution of a search warrant or in this case an arrest warrant can be 
detained for a time necessary to determine who they are and to protect the safety 
of those present during the detention. 
In this particular case they were executing an arrest warrant and in 
response to that, Mr. Bellenbrock ... had actually ran for a period of time. So 
there's nothing unreasonable about the temporary detention. 
I find that the officer's testimony that in returning to the front where the 
individuals had been detained by other officers that he could smell a strong odor 
of raw marijuana to be credible. Raw marijuana is not necessarily the amount. 
There's no evidence that that was the totality of the amount that was in the 
residence. As indicated by the testimony of the officer, no search of the residence 
was initiated. The search was limited to the consent that had been given by the 
possessor of the townhouse and that ,vas limited simply to search for individuals. 
And so the only marijuana that we know was present v;as that marijuana which 
was in plain view. And I found the officer's testimony credible. 
1 The State also argued that because the officers could lawfully detain Mr. Williams to 
investigate the alleged smell of marijuana, they had probable cause to arrest him for resisting and 
obstructing after he tried to run away. (Tr., p.39, Ls.1-7.) This argument ignores the fact that 
Officer Thueson unequivocally stated that he arrested-not merely detained-Mr. Williams for 
frequenting before Mr. Williams tried to run away from the police. If the officers did not have 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Williams for frequenting, the State cannot point to Mr. Williams' 
attempt to flee to salvage the seizure in this case. 
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I am not going to suppress evidence on the basis that the officers should 
have done more than what they did or that they should have secured the premises 
and gotten a search warrant or that they were aware that a Fourth Amendment 
for the premises allowed them to search the entire premises .. 
So I find that there was a basis for at that point arresting Williams 
based on the misdemeanor frequenting. 
The fact of the matter is that 1 find that there was a basis for the initial 
detention and that it \Vas not tantamount to arrest at that point, that there was a 
basis for a decision to arrest based on probable cause that Mr. Williams had 
committed a misdemeanor crime of frequenting based on the odor, the fact that he 
was seen coming out of the building-or the premises and there's not testimony 
that that didn't occur. How long he had been there is irrelevant. The fact that the 
area was in-that the marijuana was in plain view is further evidence of a basis 
for probable cause to charge frequenting. 
And so I am denying the motion to suppress at this time. 
(Tr., p.41, L.10-p.45, L.9.) 
Mr. Williams later entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled 
substance and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing, reserving his right to appeal the court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.47. L.3 - p.58, L.22; R., pp.102-13.) The cou1i 
sentenced Mr. Williams to a total sentence of seven years, with two years fixed (Tr., p.59, L.3 -
p.83, L.3: R., pp.174-77), and Mr. Williams timely appealed (R., pp.179-82). 
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ISSUE 
court err when it denied \Villiams' motion to suppress because the officers 
Williams for longer than necessary and then arrested him without probable 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Williams' Motion To Suppress Because The 
Officers Detained Mr. Williams For Longer Than Necessarv And Then Arrested Him Without 
Probable Cause 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts the trial 
court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. !, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are 
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v. 
State, l 36 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To owrcome that presumption, the State has the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure falls vvithin a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement and v,as reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth. 
412 U.S. at 219; Schmerber v. Cal(lornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds 
in }vfissouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552. 1555 (2013)); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833. If the 
government fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search or 
seizure, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search or seizure, is 
inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 3 71 U.S. 4 71, 485 ( l 963); Swte , .. Koivu, 152 Idaho 
511, 518-19 (2012). 
The officers in this case detained Mr. Williams for longer than necessarv to effectuate the 
~ -
purpose of the detention and then arrested Mr. Williams for frequenting without probable cause. 
This Court must suppress the evidence seized as a result of those violations. 
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The Officers Detained Mr. Williams For Longer Than Necessary To Effectuate The 
Purpose Of The Stop 
investigative detention is characterized as a seizure of limited duration ·which, when 
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, falls within a judicially created 
exception to the probable cause requirement.'· Swte v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479 (Ct. App. 
1999). If a person is detained, the scope of their detention must be carefully tailored to its 
underlying justification. Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); State v. Grantham, 
146 Idaho 490, 496 (Ct. App. 2008). An investigative detention '·must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'' Royer, 460 lJ .S. at 500; see also 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496. "Authority f<ir [a] seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the 
infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Rodrigue:: v. United 5.;tates, 
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). 
Officer Thueson claimed that the officers detained Mr. Williams for two reasons: To 
protect officer safety during Mr. Bellenbrock·s arrest and to determine \Vhether Mr. Williams 
had harbored a fugitive. (Tr.. p.20, L.23 - p.2 L L 13.) The court concluded that the officers 
could detain Mr. Williams just because he \\as present when the officers sen ed an arrest warrant 
on Mr. Bellenbrock (Tr., p.42, L. 10 p.43. L.5). and Mr. Williams conceded that the officers 
could detain him to determine whether he had harbored a fugitive (Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21 ). 
Mr. Williams thus acknowledges he cannot challenge the legality of his initial detention on 
appeal. But because the district court erroneously held that the officers could detain him simply 
because they executed an arrest warrant on l\fr. Bellenbrock, that basis for his detention could 
not support the length of his detention. Assuming that the officers could detain Mr. Williams to 
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investigate whether he had harbored a fugitiw,2 the length of his detention was longer than 
to conduct that investigation. The evidence as a result that unlawfully-
detention must be suppressed. 
1. The Officers Could Not Lavvfully Detain Mr. Williams Simply Because He Was 
In The Vicinity When The Officers Arrested Mr. Bellenbrock 
With regard to the officers' ability to detain Mr. Williams based on the execution of 
Mr. Bellenbrock's arrest warrant alone, the district court stated: 
In this case I want to make it clear that individuals who are found on the 
premises at the inception of a search and \vhose identity and connection to the 
premises are unknown may be detained for the time necessary to determine those 
facts and to protect the safety of those present during the detention. That's State 
versus Reynolds at 142 Idaho 911. It's a Court of Appeals 2007 case. 
And so individuals found at the scene where there is a legitimate-for 
example, the execution of a search warrant or in this case an arrest warrant can be 
detained for a time necessary to determine who they arc and to protect the safety 
of those present during the detention. 
In this particular case they were executing an arrest warrant and in 
response to that, Mr. Be11enbrock ... had actually ran for a period of time. So 
there's nothing unreasonable about the temporary detention. 
(Tr., p.42, L.10 - p.43, L.5.) The district court is incorrect. First, Reynolds and its predecessors, 
including lvfichigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981 ), only allow law enforcement to detain 
occupants of premises subject to a search irnrrant. Second, the reasoning behind Reynolds and 
Summers is inapplicable to situations in which law enforcement executes an arrest warrant. 
2 Despite Mr. Williams' concession below. there was no basis to investigate Mr. Wi11iams for 
"harboring a fugitive." Mr. Bellenbrock was not a fugitive-he was wanted on contempt charges 
for failing to appear for a drug test as part of drug court. State's Ex. 1 to Suppression Hearing, 
p.2; I.C. § 18-2508 (titled "inmates of public institutions," which makes it unlawful to 
"knowingly entice, harbor, employ, or aid, assist or abet in the escape, enticing, harboring or 
employment of any delinquent, insane, feeble-minded or incorrigible person committed to, or 
confined in any institution maintained by the state for the treatment, education or welfare of 
delinquent or feeble-minded, incorrigible or insane person"). 
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Because Mr. Bellenbrock' s arrest \Varrant could not justify detaining Mr. \Villiams in the first 
it similarly cannot justify prolonging the length of Williams' detention. 
district court incorrectly applied State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 91 l App. 2007), to 
this case. Reynolds held that the defendant· s detention was unlawful where the police detained 
the defendant in an open area next to a business subject to a probation search. Id at 914-1 6. 
Reynolds relied on Summers for the proposition that, "[i]n the execution of a search warrant for 
drugs or contraband at a residence, it is lawful for police to detain, during the duration of the 
search, those individuals who are occupants of the residence." Reynolds. 143 Idaho at 914 
(citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 705) (emphasis added). The Reynolds Court noted that "[e]ven if 
the officers had been conducting a search pursuant to a warrant instead of a probation search, this 
Court's [prior holdings] only authorized the detention of individuals found on the premises heing 
searched when their identity and connection to the premises arc unknown." Reynolds, 143 Idaho 
at 916 ( emphasis in original). Reynolds and Summers thus expressly limit this exception to the 
warrant requirement to situations in \\foch the officers detain occupants of premises subject to a 
search warrant for those premises. Because here the ofiicers had only an arrest warrant this 
exception is inapplicable. 
Nor does the rationale behind Summers support extending this exception to arrest 
warrants. Summers explained that ·'[ o ]f prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact 
that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's house for contraband. A neutral 
and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in 
that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided 
there." Summers, 452 U.S. at 701. Therefore, "[t]he connection of an occupant to that home 
gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of 
10 
criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant." Id. at 703-04. Three law enforcement 
also supported the ) preventing the occupant's flight in case law 
enforcement found incriminating evidence in his home; (2) minimizing the risk of harm to law 
enforcement; and (3) conducting the search in an orderly manner. Id. at 702-03. Considering 
those interests, together with the connection bet\veen occupant and the place to be searched, the 
Court found the seizure was la\,\,ful. Id. at 701-05. 
Here, on the other hand, there was no search warrant and so there was no connection 
between Mr. Williams and a place to be searched that could give the police any basis for 
suspecting him of criminal activity or for detaimng him. See at 703-04. Untethered from the 
search warrant and the resulting connection between occupant and home. the three interests 
supporting the seizure in Summers lose their luster. See id at 702-03. The first interest would 
never apply to the execution of an arrest warrant. See id And the latter tvvo interests would 
apply to the execution of every warrant, search or arrest, leading the exception to swallow the 
rule. See id at 703. 
Reynolds and Summers, by their own terms, create a narrow exception which allow 
officers to detain an occupant whose home is subject to a warrant during the execution of that 
warrant. The logic underpinning this exception has no force when applied to the detention of an 
individual who happens to be in the vicinity of officers who execute an arrest warrant. The 
district court thus erred by extending Reynolds to this case, and the mere fact that the officers 
sought to arrest Mr. Bellenbrock could not justify detaining Mr. Williams. 
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2. The Officers Detained Mr. Williams For Lornzcr Than Necessary To Investigate 
Whether He Had Harbored A Fugitive 
Because the district court relied on Reynolds to support Mr. Williams· initial detention. it 
did not decide whether the officers could have detained Mr. Williams to determine whether he 
was harboring a fugitive. Assuming, as Mr. Williams' trial counsel conceded, that the officers 
could have detained Mr. Williams to investigate that crime, the officers detained him for longer 
than necessary to determine whether he had unlawfully harbored Mr. Bellenbrock. 
Two officers stayed with Mr. Williams. Mr. Jones, and Ms. Gill when Officer Thueson 
followed Mr. Bellenbrock around to the back of the apartment. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-10.) 
Approximately three or four minutes later. Officer Thueson returned to the front of the apartment 
and allegedly smelled marijuana. (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-9.) Because Officer Thueson was the only 
witness at the suppression hearing, the State did not present any evidence about what happened 
during those three to four minutes when Officer Thueson was not with Mr. Williams. (Tr., p.16, 
Ls.2-14.) The State thus failed to give the court any reason to believe that the purpose of the 
stop was not or could not be completed by the time Officer Thueson returned to the front of the 
apartment. Moreover, the officers already kne\v who Ms. Gill was, that she lived in the 
apartment, and that she was aware of the outstanding warrant. (Tr., p.21, Ls. l 0-12.) The 
officers only needed to ask Mr. Williamson and Mr. Jones about their relationship to 
Mr. Bellenbrock to figure out who they were and whether they \Vere harboring a fugitive. This 
would have taken seconds-not minutes-to accomplish. 
The State did not and cannot meet its burden of showing that the length of the detention 
was reasonable. See S'chneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Royer, 460 U.S. at 500: Halen, 136 Idaho at 
833; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496. Because the officers detained Mr. Williams for longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. see Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 
12 
at 1614, the Court must suppress the evidence seized as a result. see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485; 
Idaho at 518-19. 
B. The Officers Arrested Mr. Williams For Frequenting Without Probable Cause To Believe 
He Knew There Was Marijuana In The Apartment 
"An arrest is characterized as a full-scale seizure of the person requiring probable cause." 
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479. Probable cause is ·'the possession of information that \vould lead a 
person of ordinary care and prudence to belie\e or entertain an honest and strong presumption 
that such person is guilty." State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136 (1996). 
Officer Thueson arrested Mr. Williams for frequenting in violation of LC. § 37-2732. 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.4-5.) Idaho Code§ 37-2732 makes it unlawful for any person to be present at any 
place in which he knows illegal controlled substances are being held for use. Therefore, Officer 
Tlmeson needed probable cause to believe thm Mr. Williams \Vas both present in the apartment 
and knew there was marijuana in the apartment. See I.C. § 37-2732; ICJI 410. The district court 
concluded that "there was a basis for a decision to arrest based on probable cause that 
Mr. Williams had committed a misdemeanor crime of frequenting based on the odor, the fact that 
he was seen coming out of the building-or the premises and there's not testimony that that 
didn't occur. How long he had been there is irrelevant. The fact that the area was in-that the 
marijuana was in plain view is further evidence of a basis for probable cause to charge 
frequenting." (Tr., p.44, L.23 p.45, L.7.) 
The State failed to meet its burden of showing that there was probable cause for 
Mr. Williams' arrest for frequenting. As an initial matter, the officers did not go inside the 
apartment and find marijuana on the table until after placing Mr. Williams under arrest (Tr., p.17. 
L.21 - p.18, L.11 ), so the court's finding that the "fact that ... the marijuana was in plain view is 
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further evidence of a basis for probable cause to charge frequenting'' is clearly erroneous, 
see 128 Idaho at 1. facts Officer Thueson cited in support of 
probable cause were limited to the smell marijuana coming from the apartment, Gill's 
admission that there was marijuana in the apartment (though Ms. Gill did not say where in the 
apartment), and Officer Thueson's observation of Mr. V./illiams leaving the apartment. 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.5-11.) But those facts would not lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to 
believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that Mr. Williams knew there vvas 
marijuana in the apartment. See Julian, 129 Idaho at 136. The State has not presented a shred of 
evidence to show that Mr. Williams saw marijuana in the apartment. The only evidence 
presented was that Ms. Gill told the officers that there V\as marijuana in the apartment. 
(Tr., p.17, Ls.13-18.) She did not say where it was located. She did not say it was in plain view. 
She did not say Mr. Williams had seen it or otherwise knew about it. Similarly, the State has not 
presented any evidence to show that Mr. Williams smelled marijuana in the apartment. Even 
assuming that the one gram of marijuana, sealed in a zip-lock bag, put off a ·'discernible odor of 
marijuana" (Tr., p.18, L.6), the officers had no evidence to show that Mr. Williams knew what 
marijuana smelled like in the first place. 
The officers thus arrested Mr. Williams not on "information that would lead a person of 
ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption" that 
Mr. Williams' was guilty, but on their unfounded assumption that Mr. Williams must have either 
seen or smelled marijuana. ,,;ee Julian, 129 Idaho at 136. The probable cause standard requires 
more. See id.; Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479. Because the officers did not hme probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Williams for frequenting. this Court must suppress the evidenced they seized as a 




Williams respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 20th day of November. 2015. 
7:zf#~~A-
of conviction and 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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